Rationally inattentive macroeconomic wedges by Antonella Tutino
 





WORKING PAPER 1005 
 
 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Rationally inattentive macroeconomic wedges
Antonella Tutino￿
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
September 8, 2010
Abstract
This paper argues that the solution to a dynamic optimization problem of consump-
tion and labor under ￿nite information-processing capacity can simultaneously explain
the intertemporal and intratemporal labor wedges. It presents a partial equilibrium
model where a representative risk adverse consumer chooses information about wealth
with limited attention. The paper compares ex-post realizations of models with ￿nite
and in￿nite capacity. The model produces macroeconomic wedges and measures of
elasticity consistent with the literature. These ￿ndings suggest that a consumption-
labor model with information-processing constraints can explain the di⁄erence between
predicted and observed consumption and employment behavior.
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Rational expectation models of consumption-leisure choice predict that people maximize
their utility by balancing contemporaneous and future consumption and leisure. The trouble
is that U.S. data on consumption and employment do not agree with the optimality condi-
tions that this theory generates. Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985) were the ￿rst to
formally test these optimality conditions against U.S. data. They concluded that the real-
izations from a stochastic dynamic optimization problem of a rational representative agent
do not match the observed consumption and work behavior in the U.S. The macroeconomic
literature1 has analyzed extensively the ways in which the solution of a rational expectation
consumption-labor problem departs from the data in search of regularities and explanations.
Despite little consensus on the causes, the empirical and the theoretical literature seem to
agree that the di⁄erences between data and theory occur on both the intratemporal and
inter-temporal margins of optimization.
The starting point of the paper is the idea that rational inattention theory might o⁄er
a way to reconcile these di⁄erences by recognizing that people allocate little attention to
changes in wealth at high frequencies and, as a result, change their intertemporal consump-
tion and leisure plans less frequently than rational expectation theory predicts. Moreover,
rational inattention predicts that people react to changes in wealth over time by varying
their plans. This way of changing consumption and labor behaviors needs not to be the
same as the long-run behavior postulated by the intratemporal ￿rst order condition of a
rational expectation model of optimal behavior.
The purpose of the paper is to show that the ex-post realizations from a stochastic
dynamic optimization problem of a rational inattentive (Sims, 2003, 2006) representative
agent can contemporaneously account for the intertemporal labor and consumption wedges
together with the intratemporal labor wedge documented in the literature.
1See, e.g., Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985), Barro and King (1984), Hall (1997), Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan (2007), and Chang and Kim (2009). For a survey, see Shimer (2009).
1The paper introduces Shannon￿ s information-processing constraints to a model of consumption-
labor choice where the only source of exogenous stochasticity comes from wages. Given his
uncertainty on how changes in wages impact wealth, the consumer selects information on
wealth functional to his consumption and labor decisions through a ￿nite capacity Shannon￿ s
channel. Consistent with fully dynamic rational inattention problems (Sims 2006, Tutino
2009), the paper assumes general ex-ante uncertainty and utility speci￿cations. Discretiza-
tion and dynamic programming solve the model producing consumer￿ s optimal choice of
information which, in turn, de￿nes consumption and labor plans. Simulating the model, the
paper shows that these plans are, at least qualitatively, consistent with observed behavior of
consumption and labor in the U.S. for both the long-run and the short-run. In particular,
when applied to the three margins of optimizations postulated by a rational expectation
model, the time series of consumption and labor generate di⁄erences between theory and
data similar to the intratemporal and intertemporal wedges documented by the literature.
The paper takes the optimality conditions from the rational expectation model and de-
￿nes these wedge as the di⁄erence between the realizations of consumption and labor that
comes from the model and those generated from a rational inattention model. The analysis
of these di⁄erences proceeds in three ways. The ￿rst way is to compute the wedges from
the de￿nition by feeding to the optimality conditions the time series of consumption and
labor generated by the rational expectation model and rational inattention models. This
step gives a statistical assessment of the size and scope of the intertemporal and intratempo-
ral wedges as a function of information-processing constraints. The second way is to study
the di⁄erential responses of consumption and labor to permanent and transitory shocks to
wages. The rational inattention model-generated impulse-response functions show that a
temporary expected positive shock to wage produces large variation in the short-run labor
supply. The same model shocked with a permanent expected positive innovation to wage
produces signi￿cant variation in the long-run consumption and minimal variation in the
long-run labor supply. These results appear robust to di⁄erent speci￿cations of utility and
2information-processing constraints. Finally, the paper measures the model-generated short-
run and long-run elasticities of labor supply. In particular, the paper asks what estimates
of short-run and long-run elasticities an econometrician would produce if he analyzes data
coming from a rational inattention representative agent economy through the lens of the
di⁄erential rational expectation optimality conditions. The results from this exercise are (1)
a backward bending labor supply curve and (2) an extremely elastic short-run labor supply
curve. These estimates are similar to those ￿rst documented by Mankiw, et. al. (1985).2
The outline of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model under in-
￿nite Shannon￿ s information-processing constraints ￿ i.e., rational expectation￿ and ￿nite
information-processing constraints ￿ i.e., rational inattention￿and de￿nes the macroeconomic
wedges between the two speci￿cations. Section 3 derives the model￿ s predictions. Section 4
computes wedges and elasticities and Section 5 concludes. Appendix A provides details on
the statistical methodology. Appendices B and C are in the journal￿ s archive. Appendix B
collects additional ￿gures and statistics and Appendix C presents a pseudocode.
The Model
The model is a one sector partial equilibrium discrete time problem. To ￿x notation
and intuition, ￿rst I discuss the model without information processing constraint. Then,
I introduce information processing constraints ￿ la Shannon and present the full rational
inattention model. Finally, I characterize the a-temporal and intertemporal wedges that
derive from the comparison of the two models.
A version of the model under in￿nite processing capacity
The economy is populated by a representative household who maximizes the expected
discounted value of his utility. Utility, u(C;L), is de￿ned over a consumption good, C, and
2Mankiw et. al. (1985) report similar ￿ndings on estimates of elasticities of labor supply ￿tting U.S. data
to a stochastic dynamic rational expectation model of consumption-labor choice.
3labor, L and it is strictly increasing and concave in C and decreasing and concave in L,
limC!0 uC (C;L) = +1,8L 2 [0;1], limL!0 uL (C;L) = ￿1 8C ￿ 0. Moreover, I assume
that utility is homogeneous and additively separable. In particular:






where ￿ is the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply, " > 0, and ￿ > 0 is a constant
disutility associated to labor.
Each period, the consumer faces a stochastic real wage, s, in exchange for his labor e⁄ort.
Wage follows a stationary i.i.d. Markov process. 3 Consumer￿ s wealth, W, evolves according
to previous￿period savings (W ￿ C), augmented by a ￿xed and exogenous interest rate,
R, and labor income, s ￿ L. Given the assumption on the wage process, the problem is
stationary. The recursive formulation of the household￿ s problem is:
V (Wt) = max
Ct;Lt
u(Ct;Lt) + ￿EtV (Wt+1) (2)
s.t.
Wt+1 = R(Wt ￿ Ct) + stLt (3)
W0 given (4)
Lt ￿ 1, Ct ￿ 0 8(L;C), 8t (5)
Note that in this setting the only source of uncertainty is wage, s. So long as wages
are i.i.d. processes, uncertainty about wages translates directly into uncertainty about next
period￿ s wealth. It follows that the initial condition on wealth, (4), is equivalent to knowing
s0. Expectations of the Bellman value next period - V (W 0)- are taken conditional on the
current value of W. Moreover, I assume that ￿R = 1. Optimality conditions of the household
3Given that the point of the paper is to characterize the macroeconomic wedges between a rational
expectation model and a model with rational inattention in the simplest possible framework, I assume that
wages are i.i.d..








So long as both ￿ and ￿ are ￿nite and with a desire to smooth consumption implied by (1),
condition (S) implies that labor will change through time re￿ ecting changes in wages. The


















To match the joint behavior of per capita consumption and per capita hours that we
observe in U.S. data, the model should produce (1) cyclical movements: procyclical behavior
of per capita consumption and per capita hours worked￿ i.e., equation (S) calls for a high
intertemporal elasticity of labor supply ￿ ; (2) secular movements: labor supply￿ s response
to permanent changes in wages is negligible while consumption￿ s responses are signi￿cant
and essentially match the changes in wages￿ i.e., equation (EL) calls for a low intertemporal
elasticity of labor supply￿ .
As Mankiw, et. al. (1985) noted, the ￿rst order conditions (S)-(EL) cannot account for
facts (1) and (2) simultaneously. They ￿t the optimality conditions (S)-(EL) to U.S. data
and ￿nd that U.S. data do not support the model. This negative result prompts the authors
to question the validity of stochastic dynamic optimization as useful framework to match
data on consumption and labor.
5A version of the model under ￿nite processing capacity
Under Rational Inattention Theory (Sims, 1998, 2003, 2006) information is fully and
freely available to the agents. However, people cannot process quickly and precisely all the
information due to Shannon￿ s processing constraints. The assumption that people process
information at ￿nite rate implies a profound modi￿cation of the problem (2)-(5). First,
with ￿nite-processing capacity wages and, in turn, wealth cannot be observed perfectly
at any point in time. As a result, the consumer starts his optimization problem with an
idea of what his wealth is. I model formally this concept by characterizing this "idea"
as a set of possible events concerning wealth W with associated probability distribution,
b(W). This distribution constitutes the new state of the problem. Second, given that the
knowledge of wealth is stochastic, before processing any information, the decisions A = C;L
of consumption, C, and hours worked, L, ought to be random variables. Third, given
the stochastic knowledge of decisions and state and limited-processing capacity, to solve the
optimization problem the consumer needs a strategy that relates information about wealth to
his decisions. In other words, he needs to choose signals about wealth functional to sharpen
his consumption and labor plans. I model formally this concept by having the consumer
choose the joint distribution of labor, consumption and wealth, p(￿w;￿a), as control variable
for the state b(W). Note that the signal can provide information about any dimension
of behavior - A- and wealth - W- that the person wants, with the restriction that the
information content of the signal cannot exceed consumer￿ s processing capacity. Forth, the
consumer evaluates the outcome of his strategy by observing his consumption pro￿le (c￿),
and labor supply (l￿). I model this by assuming that the consumer draws from the optimal
distribution p￿ (￿w;￿a) a realization (a = [c;l]).
Figure 1:A typical day of a rationally inattentive person.
6Fifth, the consumer observes the outcomes of his choices and uses the observation to
update rationally his knowledge of wealth. Formally, given an outcome a and using Bayes￿
rule, consumers￿knowledge of next period￿ s wealth is embedded in the posterior b(w0ja).
Figure 1 describes the events.
Statement and Recursive Formulation of Consumer￿ s Problem
I discuss each element of the model in turn, starting from the constraints. First, I present
the budget constraint and discuss its role in updating the knowledge of wealth for a ￿nite-
capacity consumer. Second, I turn to the information-￿ ow constraint, key of the model.
Third, I present the objective function and cast the problem into a recursive formulation.
The structure of the economy follows closely the one of Tutino (2009) to which I refer for
the mathematical details. For completeness, Appendix A rigorously proves that the problem
admits a recursive formulation and that the resulting Bellman equation is a contraction.
Budget Constraint and Update
Recall that C denotes consumption of the good in the economy and L is the amount of
labor supplied. I collect the actions at time t in the set At ￿ fCs;Lsgt￿s￿1. The consumer
is limited in his choices by the same budget constraint as in (3) and reported here for
convenience:
Wt+1 = Rt (Wt ￿ Ct) + stLt (6)
where Rt = R is the (constant) interest rate on savings, (Wt ￿ Ct), st is the wage the
agent receives in exchange of Lt units of labor. As in the setting with in￿nite processing
capacity, the process characterizing the wages is a stationary i.i.d. process. Wages are
the only exogenous source of stochasticity in the model. The consumer wishes to reduce
uncertainty about the linear combination of savings and labor income as displayed in (6).
Since information is available, people can directly acquire signals about the law of motion of
7wealth although they cannot observe the exact value of wealth due to information-processing
constraints. I assume that the consumer makes consumption and labor decisions knowing
that the mean of the wages is ￿xed at ￿ s. This knowledge is embedded in a prior over the
possible realizations of wealth, g (wt). The consumer updates rationally his belief through
signals on wealth and observation of past consumption and work behaviors.
Let a ￿ fc;lg be a particular behavior of consumer where c is a speci￿c realization of
the random variable C and, similarly, l is a speci￿c outcome of the random variable L. The







0;w;~ a) ￿ p(wj~ a)dw (7)
where T (w0;:;:) derives from the dynamic of wealth (6).The operator T (w0;w;~ a) assigns
probabilities to w0 conditional on the value of ~ a and w. Since values of w are not observable,
the operator T (:) applies an expectation over the unknown w. For a particular realization
of ~ a =
n
C = ~ c;L = ~ l
o
, the operators is de￿ned as:
T (w




(w ￿ ~ c)dw + ￿ s~ l: (8)
The distribution p(wj~ a) takes into account the potential noise in the current observation of
the state that arises from choosing the signal p(w;~ a). This noisy observation is carried over
one period ahead to infer next period￿ s state.
Choice Variable
As stated in Section 2.2, before processing any information about wealth (W), consump-
tion (C) and labor (L) are random variables from the consumer￿ s perspective. Thus, the
consumer cannot solve his optimization problem without relating wealth to his behavior (C
and L). Since the consumer starts his life with a probabilistic knowledge of W, mapping W
into C and L translates into ￿nding a joint relation among wealth, consumption and labor
8that matches information about wealth to consumption and labor. The selection of this
information, that is, the joint probability distribution of wealth, consumption and labor,
p(￿w;￿c;￿l), is key in the optimization of the consumer since it a⁄ects current beliefs and
updates.
To clarify this point, suppose that the consumer can process information at in￿nite rate.
In this case, the optimal p(￿w;￿c;￿l) will be degenerate assigning to each value of w one value
for c￿ (w) and l￿ (w), as in the solution (S)-(EL). By contrast, suppose that the consumer has
extremely limited information-processing capacity. In this case, he might choose to use the
capacity to assess the limits of his wealth and to keep consumption and labor fairly constant
and at or below those limits.4 When the information-processing e⁄ort lies in between this
two extreme cases, optimizing consumers set p(￿w;￿c;￿l) such that the conditional probability
of wealth given consumption and labor -i.e., the posterior of wealth- is as close to wealth
as possible given the information constraint and the preference spelled out in the utility
function.5
Information Constraint
For people with limited information-processing capacity, attention is a scarce resource. To
model the technology that makes this resource limited I use Shannon￿ s mutual information6
between the random variables W and A. Mutual information de￿nes the capacity of the
channel and depends only on the joint distribution of W and A for a given belief g (W). In
the context of the model, Shannon￿ s capacity captures the ability of consumers to interpret
news about their wealth, thereby regulating the speed of reaction of their behavior to this
news. Formally, Shannon￿ s capacity measures the maximum reduction in uncertainty as the
4The behavior described is certainly true for a risk-averse consumer with very limited capacity as illus-
trated in section 4. I have not investigated the cases of risk-lover or risk-neutral consumers.
5Exploring the interaction between information processing constraints and general speci￿cations for pref-
erences is relatively novel to the literature of rational inattention which has focussed mainly on the Linear
Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) framework (Sims 2003, Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2008a, 2008b). See Sims
(2006) and Tutino (2010) for a discussion of advantages and disavantages of moving into a fully dynamic
rational inattention model with respect to the LQG framework.
6See Shannon (1954), Sims (2003, 2006).
9di⁄erence between the initial uncertainty -entropy of W- and the knowledge of the variable
W provided by the observation of A -i.e., conditional entropy of W given A-. 7
I model people￿ s ability to map information about wealth into consumption and labor
decisions by assuming a constant and exogenous shadow cost on the information-processing
constraint -i.e., mutual information between W and A-.8 In the model, such a cost is denoted
by ￿.9 Formally, let I (p(￿w;￿a)) be the mutual information implied by the choice of the joint
distribution of W and A, (p(￿w;￿a)). The constraint that limits the amount of processable
information at each time t is given by :











The expression in (9) says that the uncertainty that the consumer can reduce about
wealth through observation of consumption and labor supply is at most ￿ bits per unit of
time. Mapping formulae into the intuition from the previous section, had the consumer had
in￿nite processing capacity, he would have been able to choose a signal which makes each
of his actions very informative about wealth. This strategy results in a policy function for
consumption, labor and wealth that depends on the -now observable- value of wealth. On
the other extreme, with almost no processing capacity, a consumer might want to assign
all the probability to a particular value of A. This choice makes the variables W and A
independent of each other, (I (p(￿w;￿a)) ! 0). In the intermediate case, the person attends
to information that make his saving and labor decisions as related as to wealth as his utility
commands and his information-processing constraint allows.
7Since mutual information is a function of the joint distribution of W and A for a given belief, it is
applicable regardless of the nature and characteristics of the channel.
8The assumption of having a shadow cost on information-processing constraint reduces the computational
burden. Moreover, note that having a shadow cost associated to information-processing constraint and
￿t = It (p(￿w;￿a)) holding with equality, is isomorphic to assuming a bound on the maximum amount of
capacity while having the constraint holding with inequality, that is ￿ ￿ ￿ It (p(￿w;￿a)), 8t. The isomorphism
comes from realizing that there exists a one-to-one mapping between ￿ ￿ and the shadow cost of the channel,
￿. The latter approach is adopted by, e.g., Sims (2003) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2008a) while the
￿rst approach is adopted by e.g., Sims (2006) and Tutino (2010).
9This way of modeling information-processing constraints is consistent with Sims (2006, 2009) and
Macrowiak and Wiederholt (2009).
10Objective
Consumer￿ s problem is to maximize over an in￿nite planning horizon expected utility of
consumption and leisure discounted at factor ￿ < 1. Let ￿ be the (￿xed and exogenous)
shadow cost of processing information ￿ in (9). Moreover, let utility be:





where ￿ is the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply - de￿ned as "- and ￿ 2 [0;1] is
a constant disutility associated to labor. The control for agent￿ s maximization is the joint
distribution of actions and wealth, p(w;a), that solves : 10




























~ w p(~ w;a))g (w)
￿
(12)
together with the rational update (7) and the requirement that p(w;a) 2 D, where D is the
set of all distributions that satisfy:
X
a
p(~ w;a) = g (~ w) (13)





p(w;a) = 1: (15)
10For a formal prove that the in￿nite problem of the household can be cast into a recursive Bellman
program see Appendix A.
11In addition (3) and (5) are imposed. Taking ￿rst order condition with respect to p(w;a)
results in 11
@p(w;a) :











































































The expression in (16) reveals that in selecting the optimal p(w;a) the consumer evalu-
ates the impact that his choice has on the current level of his value function, u(c;l) +













￿ [@g (w0ja)=@p(w;a)]. To my knowledge, expressions like
(16) do not admit an analytical solution except for some particular cases. 12 De￿ne the
solution to the optimization problem of the consumers as the distribution p￿ (￿w;￿a). The
realized outcomes at = (fctg;fltg) are then drawn from the optimal joint p￿ (￿w;￿c;￿l).
11Note that the ￿rst order condition in (16) is valid for ￿ > 0. If ￿ = 0, then the probabilities g (w) and
p(￿w;￿a) are degenerate. In this case, I (p(￿w;￿a)) = 0, and using Fano￿ s inequality (Thomas and Cover
1991), c(I (p(￿w;￿a))) = c(w) and l(I (p(￿w;￿a))) = l(w). This result makes the ￿rst order conditions for
this case equal to the full information solution.
12The solution of a static problem with log utility corresponds to a Lambert W function which in general
does not have a close form expression. Analytical expressions are possible under some restriction on the
utility function and the ex-ante shape of uncertainty. One such case is within the Linear Quadratic Gaussian
framework. For others, see Matejka and Sims (2009).
12Wedges
When the consumer chooses the joint distribution p￿ (￿w;￿c;￿l), he is ultimately choosing a
metric under which he forms expectations on future values of wealth. To be more speci￿c, un-
der in￿nite-processing capacity, the information set upon which expectations are conditioned
corresponds to the set ￿t that includes current and past realization of wealth, consumption
and labor. By contrast, with ￿nite-processing capacity, expectations are conditioned on a
set Zt that includes current and past beliefs about wealth, current and past optimal choices,
p(￿w;￿a), and realizations of consumption and labor. If the channel transmits at ￿nite rate
there will be a di⁄erence between the optimality conditions (S)-(EL) evaluated under the
expectations Et (:j￿t) ￿ Et (:) and Et (:jZt) ￿ Ep￿ (:).
Consider the static ￿rst order condition (S) and let m(a;w(s)) ￿ (￿@U (a;w)=@L=@U (a;w)=@C)
be the marginal rate of substitution. De￿ne ￿s as the static wedge that makes the ￿rst order
condition evaluated at an optimal strategy p￿(w;a), that is:






































and ￿nally, from (EL) the labor intertemporal wedge is:
￿
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13As noted, in general there is no close form solution for p￿ (:;:), which makes the com-
putation of expectations Ep￿(c;w) and, in turn, an analytical characterization of the wedges
(17)-(19) very di¢ cult. 13 However, as pointed out by Altonji (1982), a viable alternative
to knowing people￿ s expectations is to look at behavior which, together with the theory,
reveals what people were expecting. This paper follows Altonji￿ s intuition by evaluating the
expectations derived from the solution of the rational inattention model (11) - (14) through
the simulated time series of consumption, labor and wealth. This way of computing expecta-
tions serves two purposes. The ￿rst is to derive the intertemporal and intratemporal wedges
(17)-(19) by comparing the behavior under rational inattention and rational expectations.
The second purpose is to evaluate short-run and long-run elasticities of intertemporal sub-
stitution feeding the model-generated time series into the totally di⁄erentiated expressions
(S)-(EL).14
Before turning to the study of the wedges and the elasticities, next section solves the
model and illustrates some properties of the solution. A reader not interested in technical
aspects and robustness results may want to skip directly to Section 4.
Solution and predictions of the model
Optimal conditional distribution
Figures 2a and 2b show the optimal conditional distribution of consumption and labor15
respectively for a given value of wealth - w = 1, top panel w = 4, medium panel and w = 8,





where ~ a￿ (w) is the combination of (L;C) that sat-
isfy condition (S), ￿ (:) is the Dirac function equal to 1 when a = ~ a and zero elsewhere, and ￿(w(s)) is the
measure under which we evaluate the integral that allows for discreteness in the distribution.
14This way of computing elasticities is used by Mankiw, et. al. (1985). A similar venue is taken by Chang
and Kim (2009).
15The optimal conditional distributions in Figures 2a and 2b are calculated as follows. For a given value




p￿ (c;ljw￿) coming from the solution of the optimization problem (11)-(5) and L being the set of possible
values of labor, l. A similar expression holds for p(ljw￿).
14bottom panel- and two values of the shadow cost of information processing - ￿ = 0:2, blue
bars, and ￿ = 2, solid green line-. The ￿gures plot the optimal conditional distribution for
a given simplex point.16 Consider ￿rst the optimal conditional distribution of consumption
when wealth is low -Figure 2a, top panel-. For w = 1, the optimal signal for a person with
￿ = 0:2 - blue bars in the picture- places high probability mass on low values of consumption
(c = 0:7) but it also allows for the possibility of higher consumption - c = 2:3 and c = 3:1-
sustained by labor income. As the top panel of Figure 2b shows, the optimal distribution
of labor conditional to w = 1 for a person with ￿ = 0:2 places more than 60% probability
on values of hours worked above the median level - l = 3:5 - of the support of labor. By
contrast, when wealth is high -w = 8, bottom panel in Figure 2a and 2b- the agent with
￿ = 0:2 assigns high probability to high values of consumption -c = 5:1-. Note that although
the agent reduces his labor e⁄ort with respect to the case w = 1, he still places more than
40% of probability of working at and above the median value for hours worked so that he
can maintain high value of consumption with labor income and savings. For a medium
value of wealth, w = 4, the agent with ￿ = 0:2 assigns most of the probability mass to
values of consumption between 2 and 3. However, the agent assigns also positive -even if
small- probability to high value of consumption -c = 5:5 with probability 0:02- counting
on ￿nancing consumption expenditures through labor income. Also, for this type of agent,
choices of labor are focused on the medium values of the support with a peak at l = 2:8 with
16In Appendix B, the values reported for the statistics of consumption, labor, wealth and information ￿ ow
are average across simplex-points and Monte Carlo runs.
15probability 0:42:






































Figure 2a: Optimal conditional distribution of consumption for ￿=0:2 (bar) and ￿=2 (line)
Now consider an agent with the same preferences as the previous one but ￿ = 2. Figure
2a and 2b show that a ￿ = 2-type has more spread distributions of consumption and labor
than a ￿ = 0:02-type. The noisier behaviors of labor and consumption are due to the fact
that people with ￿ = 2 have lower reduction in uncertainty about wealth than people with
￿ = 0:2. Thus, their optimal probability is less informative than that of types ￿ = 0:2.
For instance, consider the conditional distribution of consumption and labor when wealth is
high, w = 8. The person with ￿ = 2 places higher probability on low values of consumption
16than the person with ￿ = 0:2 does.17






































Figure 2b: Optimal conditional distribution of labor for ￿=0:2 (bar) and ￿=2 (line)
Model predictions
I de￿ne a model as a set M = f￿;￿;￿g and I study the behavior of consumption, labor and
wealth for ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1 and ￿ 2 (f0:02g;f0:2g;f2g). I choose three values of ￿ as a proxy for
three types of individuals that face di⁄erent shadow costs of processing information ranging
from low (￿ = 0:02) to medium (￿ = 0:2) to high (￿ = 2). The choice of these particular
numerical values can be explained as follows. I verify empirically that given the discretization
of core states and core decisions and the baseline utility, a value of ￿ between 1 and 3 leads to
the same quantitative results in terms of choice of distribution. Thus, I pick the middle value
in the set ￿ 2 [1;3) for the high shadow cost of information-processing. The optimal choice
of the joint distribution p(w;a) is similar for value of ￿ 2 (0:1;0:6]. Again, I pick the middle
17Additional results are in Appendix B in the journal￿ s archive. In particular, tables 10a￿10b in Appendix
7 show that the expected values of consumption and labor for a person with ￿ = 0:2 is E (c) = 3:95 with
standard deviation ￿ (c) = 1:10 for consumption and E (l) = 2:68 and ￿ (L)1:06 for labor. A person with
￿ = 2 enjoys on average E (c) = 3:55 units of consumption with standard deviation ￿ (c) = 1:79 and works
an average of E (l) = 3:05 hours with ￿ (l) = 1:52. The average information ￿ ow is 1:08 bits for an individual
with ￿ = 0:2 and 0:73 bits for a person with ￿ = 2.
17value in the interval for the second choice of ￿. Similar reasoning leads to ￿ = 0:02 as lower
value of ￿ when ￿ takes up values in (0:01;0:05). For values of ￿ above 5, households acquire
very little information about wealth and set consumption and labor basically constant. Also,
values of ￿ below 0:01 deliver a solution close to the full information case.
Tables 10a￿10c in Appendix B present the moments of the time series for consumption,
labor and wealth for each ￿ in ￿ 2 (f0:02g;f0:2g;f2g) as average across Monte Carlo
simulations and simplex points.18 For each ￿, mean, standard deviation, auto- and cross-
correlations of the simulated series are calculated after taking averages of 7;000 Monte Carlo
runs and simplex points. Figure 8-11 in Appendix B shows the time series of the model-
generated consumption, labor and wealth. The ￿gure con￿rms that the persistence of these
series is higher the higher the information cost is. The results are summarized in the following
￿ndings:
For the model M (￿;1;1), ￿ 2 (f0:02g;f0:2g;f2g) :
Finding 1. the standard deviation of consumption over labor is greater than 1. The volatil-
ity is higher the higher the shadow cost of information is. Moreover, the higher the
shadow cost of information, the more: (1) the more sluggish consumption and labor
are; (2) sizeable the readjustment of both behavior is once changes in wealth are ac-
knowledged.
Finding 2. the autocorrelation of consumption and labor is above 0.8.
Finding 3. the contemporaneous cross correlation between consumption and labor is above
0.80. Moreover, consumption and labor are more correlated to lagged values of wealth
than contemporaneous values of wealth.
Finding 1 says that the model generates excess volatility of consumption with respect
to labor supply. This result depends on the bound of information-processing capacity and
18Following the same methodology, tables 10d ￿ 10f in Appendix B produce the statistics for the cases
M = (f0:2;3;1g;f0:2;1;4g;f0:2;1;:25g).
18its interplay with the utility function. To illustrate this point, consider a consumer with log
utility in consumption and Frisch labor supply elasticity equal to 1 receiving a positive shock
to wealth. Had the household had in￿nite capacity, he would have chosen to smooth con-
sumption by varying labor supply. With positive and ￿nite information-processing capacity,
he cannot track wealth exactly but through signals on wealth as precise as his channel al-
lows. He holds o⁄changing consumption and keeps the same labor supply while he processes
signals about wealth. If he has accumulated too much savings ￿due to the low information
content of the period-by-period signal￿ , he has enough to a⁄ord a permanently higher steady
state value of consumption than before. On average, the variation of consumption is bigger
than the one of labor because of the utility speci￿cation and also the information processing
constraint.19 The intuition for Finding 2 lies on the mechanism through which the consumer
updates his knowledge of wealth, in (7). Each period he chooses a signal on wealth, decides
consumption and labor on the basis of that signal and forms his posterior on wealth given
his decisions. The higher the processing cost, the less informative the signal is. This in turn
means that most of the update derives from the observations of past values of consumption
and labor. From the previous example, if a positive shock to wealth is acknowledged with
delays, then the behavioral responses to this shock will be delayed resulting in a strong
autocorrelation between current and past values of consumption and labor. Finding 3 says
that the model predicts a strong comovement of labor and consumption. It also shows a
strong correlation between contemporaneous consumption and wealth when information ￿ ow
is high. The rationale for this ￿nding is that these variables are related in two ways. The
￿rst is through the budget constraint (6) which is used to update the prior on wealth. The
second is through the optimal policy of the consumer which is chosen to link tightly behavior
(consumption and labor) and wealth.
19These e⁄ects occur because (1) utility speci￿cation commands a relatively stronger desire to smooth
consumption than leisure; (2) the higher the shadow cost of using the channel is, the less informative is the
signal that the agent processes, the longer he waits to change behaviors.
19Robustness
Tables 10d￿10f in Appendix B illustrate the relationships among risk aversion, ￿; Frisch
elasticity of substitution, 1=￿, and shadow cost of information, ￿. Table 10d shows that, for
a given ￿ and elasticity of substitution, the higher the coe¢ cient of risk aversion is, the
higher the mean and the lower the variance of consumption are. An intuitive argument
uses the example above: a risk averse person hit by a positive shock to wealth would not
react to the shock immediately by changing consumption or hours worked. Once he processed
information about wealth, he had accumulated enough savings to increase both consumption
and leisure. The more risk averse the person is and the higher the shadow cost of using the
channel is, the more he would want to process information before changing his behavior.
Thus, shadow costs of processing information enhance precautionary savings. For a given ￿
and ￿, a lower the Frisch elasticity of substitution (from 1=￿ = 4 to 1=￿ = 0:25 in Tables 10e
and 10f; respectively) generates lower mean and lower variances for both consumption and
labor. Keeping the degree of risk aversion ￿xed, a low Frisch elasticity increases the income
e⁄ect over the substitution e⁄ect. However, the presence of information processing constraint
induces a substitution e⁄ect that lessens the income e⁄ect. If the signal on wealth is very
noisy, consumers supply more labor than they would do in the case of perfect information
and 1=￿ = 0:25, since they are not certain that their wealth is actually increasing. When
the collected information signals high wealth, labor supply suddenly decreases. The opposite
occurs when consumers process information about a decrease in wealth.
To get a sense on how the shadow cost of information a⁄ects consumption and labor
behaviors when the Frisch elasticity goes to in￿nity, consider M (￿) ￿ f￿;(￿ ! 1;￿ = 0)g
with ￿ 2 (f0:02g;f0:2g;f2g). The ￿rst observation is that as the information cost increases,
average consumption, labor and information ￿ ow decrease, while the standard deviations of
these series increase. This is also true for wealth. An intuitive explanation of this result
comes from the comparison with the rational expectation model. Under full information,
log-utility (￿ ! 1) people prefer to smooth consumption. Moreover, with in￿nite Frisch
20elasticity, ( i.e., ￿ = 0) labor supply adjusts according to wealth ￿ uctuations to accommodate
consumption smoothing. Under ￿nite information-processing capacity, rational households
choose signals about wealth with the same purpose. If the shadow cost is low, ￿ = 0:02,
consumers choose a signal about wealth informative enough to allow them to use labor
supply to smooth ￿ uctuations in wealth and, in turn, consumption. By contrast, if the
shadow cost is high, ￿ = 2, consumers keep track of wealth slowly and, as a consequence,
modify consumption and labor sporadically. When they do change their behavior, they do
so by a signi￿cant amount. The resulting time path for wealth inherits the higher variance
of consumption and labor and, on average, has higher mean than in the ￿ = 0:02-case due to
the increase in savings in periods of inertial behavior. A sample path of consumption under
di⁄erent ￿
0s-scenarios is in Figure 3.
Comparing consumption for u(c;l)=log(c)￿￿l

























Figure 3: Sample path of consumption for di⁄erent ￿￿ s.
The second observation is that consumption is smoother the lower information-processing
shadow costs are. Figure 4 corroborates the argument. Consumers with ￿ = 0:02 save at
the beginning of the simulated period to enjoy high level of consumption later on.20 By
20Recall that the time series of consumption, labor and wealth are derived from the model starting from
a low value of wealth. Thus, at the beginning of the simulated periods people have very little savings.
21contrast, consumers with ￿ = 2 track wealth with noise and this is re￿ ected in a prolonged
period of savings while processing information about wealth. This behavior results into slow
and sizeable adjustments of consumption during the simulated period. From Figure 4, note
how individuals with less processing capacity (￿ = 2) postpone an increase in consumption
more than the other people (￿ = 0:2 and ￿ = 0:02) do. Types ￿ = 2 acknowledge the
accumulation of wealth due to the additional savings later in the simulation. This delay
forces them to increase their consumption for a short period of time at the end of the
simulation period. Given the strong correlation between consumption and labor and the
preference speci￿cation, people with ￿ = 0:02 work harder at the beginning of the simulation
to ￿nance their consumption, though they manage to enjoy some leisure at the end of the
simulation.
Comparing consumption and labor for u(c;l)=log(c)￿￿l
















































































































































































Figure 4: Time series of consumption and labor, various ￿
The third observation is that correlation between consumption and labor is higher the
higher the information costs are. The intuition for this result is that the behavioral reactions
to accumulation of wealth are delayed by individual￿ s capacity of processing information. As
the person has better knowledge of his wealth, he reviews both plans. People￿ s actions are
22mirrored in wealth accumulation. Individuals with ￿ = 0:02 build up savings at the beginning
of the period to spend gradually later on. This way of smoothing consumption in time is
akin to that under full information.
Comparing consumption(blue) and wealth (red) for u(c;l)=log(c)￿￿l





















































































































































































Figure 5: Time series of wealth and consumption, log-lin utility, various ￿
People with less processing capacity adjust with delays consumption to ￿ uctuations in wealth.
Such delays smooth consumption while consumers are processing information but at the same
time, call for major revisions afterwards. Note also how consumption and labor lag wealth
for ￿ = 2: The cross-correlation coe¢ cients between lagged wealth and current consumption
is 0:65 while the contemporaneous correlation is 0:47. A similar result holds for labor and
lagged values of wealth. This result depends on the fact that a consumer with low capacity
relies mostly on past value of consumption and labor to update his knowledge of wealth.
While waiting, wealth accumulates and so does information until the consumer changes
behavior. This mechanism implies lagged behavioral responses to wealth￿ s ￿ uctuations.
23Macroeconomic wedges and elasticities
This section presents the wedges (17)-(19) as a function of the shadow cost of information
processing constraint, ￿. Throughout the section, I ￿x the speci￿cation of the utility to ￿ ! 1
and ￿ = 1, that is u(c;l) = log(c) ￿ (0:01) ￿ l2:
I evaluate the intratemporal and intertemporal wedges by using data simulated from the
solution of the problem with rational inattention and rational expectations. In particular, I
solve the model for each ￿ where ￿ takes up values on a grid of 150 equi-spaced points in [0;3].
Each ￿ > 0 corresponds to a di⁄erent model with rational inattention whereas ￿ = 0 delivers
the solution of the model under rational expectations.21 Each of these models produces an
optimal distribution from which I draw 7;000 simulated time series of consumption, labor
and wealth for T = 100 periods. The models of rational inattention and the model of rational
expectations share the same discretization and calibration in Table 1 as well as the same
paths for wages. The simulated time series from the rational expectation model and the
rational inattention models are then fed to equations (17)-(19). I compute sample statistics
averaging across the Monte Carlo runs, periods and, for the rational inattention models,
simplex points.
I evaluate short-run and long-run elasticities by computing the behavioral responses of
rational inattention agents to changes in wealth. Speci￿cally, I shock the rationally inatten-
tive economy with a temporary 10% increase in wage at the beginning of the simulation.
The corresponding impulse-response function of consumptions and labor are then fed to the
totally di⁄erentiated expressions (EC)-(EL) to evaluate short-run elasticities. Similarly, I
assume a permanent 10% increase in wage at the beginning of the simulation and compute
long-run elasticities by evaluating the totally di⁄erentiated expressions (S) and (6) through
the impulse-response functions of consumption. Finally, I investigate what the estimates of
long-run and short-run elasticities would be if an econometrician was to evaluate the totally
21More explicitly, I divide the interval [0;3] in 150 equally spaced points. Thus, I solve the problem (2)
- (14) with 150 values of ￿ each of which corresponding to a di⁄erent speci￿cation of the model M (￿) =
f￿;￿ ! 1;￿ = 1 g for ￿ 2 [0;3].
24di⁄erentiated (S)-(EL) using data coming from a rationally inattentive economy.
Intratemporal and intertemporal wedges
For i = S;EC;EL, ￿gures 5 shows the mean, E (￿i) ￿￿rst column ￿ , the standard
deviation, ￿ (￿i) ￿second column ￿and the signal to noise ratio, E (￿i)=￿ (￿i) ￿third
column ￿of the expressions (17)-(19) as a function of ￿.
Consider the mean of the three wedges (￿rst column). When ￿ = 0 ￿ i.e., when the
capacity of the channel approaches in￿nity ￿the solution of the problem (2) - (14) mimics
the solution of the rational expectation problem (11)-(5) resulting in no wedge, E (￿i) = 0.
So long as ￿ increases, so does the mean of the wedges. For ￿ 2 (0:2;2), the static wedge
increases at a lower rate than it does for ￿ 2 (0;0;2). This change in slope re￿ ects the
change in the composition of ￿S: Consumers with ￿ 2 (0:6;1:2) enjoy higher consumption
and lower labor supply than consumers with ￿ 2 (1:2;2). Similarly, the slope of ￿EC and ￿EL
￿ attens for ￿ 2 (0:2;2), re￿ ecting slight revisions of consumption and labor plans as soon as
consumers process more information about wealth. The same intuition explains the increase
in wedges for ￿ 2 (2;2:5). For ￿ ￿ 2:5 consumers have little capacity to track wealth and to
connect it to their consumption and labor. Thus, they set a constant level of consumption
and work consistent with the static version of (6) even in the event of low income. These
kinds of consumption and work behaviors allow consumers to process minimal information
about wealth and still satisfying the budget constraint.
A comparison across means of the wedges reveals that the static wedge is bigger than
the intertemporal wedges, re￿ ecting the fact that ￿nite processing capacity may generate
sizeable long-run distortions. Moreover, the mean of ￿EL is higher than that of ￿EC for
all ￿ 2 (0;0:25). The reason for this result lies in the speci￿cation of consumer￿ s utility:
with preference for smooth consumption relatively stronger than disutility of labor the agent
o⁄sets excessive ￿ uctuations of wealth by changing his labor￿ s schedule more than his con-
sumption. With lower and lower capacities the revisions to both plans become infrequent
25and, when they occur, they represent a sharp deviation from previous plans.
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Figure 6: Mean -￿rst column-, standard deviation -second column- and SNR of ￿S (red), ￿EC (blue) and ￿EL (green).




is very small and relatively ￿ at so that the time series of consumption,
labor and wealth mimic those of the solution under rational expectations. As ￿ increases,




￿ 2 (0:2;2), and even more steeper in ￿ 2 (2;2:5). For ￿ ￿ 2:5, the consumer ￿nds it too
demanding to track wealth with high precision and resorts to a constant consumption and
labor. Hence, in this case ￿
￿
￿S￿
= 0. The rationale for this behavior is as follows. For low
values of ￿, there exists a high correlation of the time series of consumption, labor and wealth
(C;L;W (s)) generated by ￿tting to (S) the simulated series from the rational inattention
model. Such a strong correlation occurs because people with higher capacity (lower ￿)
have better knowledge of the evolution of their wealth and its connection to consumption
and labor supply than people with lower capacity have. Moreover, with better information
26about wealth, the consumer has less volatile consumption and labor behavior. 22 Low
variance of C and L and strong correlation of (C;L;W (s)) both reduce the variance of ￿S.
The consumer tracks wealth with low precision when ￿ takes up values in (0:2;2:5). As
a result, his decisions (C;L) are be more volatile and the correlation among (C;L;W (s))
increases the volatility of ￿S. As noticed above, for ￿ ￿ 2:5, consumption and labor plans
are essentially constant, resulting in a negligible ￿
￿
￿S￿
. A similar reasoning applies to the






. By comparing the standard deviation of the three










. Higher short-run estimates of volatility of the level of labor with respect to the
estimates of consumption come from the agent￿ s preference for more stable consumption
growth than labor growth.
The standard deviation of ￿EL is higher than that of ￿S for ￿ 2 (0:5;2:5). This re-
sult occurs because, for low values of ￿, the correlation among labor, consumption and
wealth(C;L;W (s)) is higher than the correlation between wage growth and labor growth
in (￿L (a;w(s))). As ￿ increases, the correlation between the wage growth rate and labor
growth rate becomes weaker and the volatility of the growth of labor is higher than that of
(C;L;W (s)) because of the delayed revisions in labor. I interpret this result as suggesting
that, in this model, low information-processing capacity ampli￿es more the distortions to
the intertemporal labor wedge than it does to the intratemporal labor wedge.23
Finally, consider the signal to noise ratio (SNR), E (￿i)=￿ (￿i), in the third column of
￿gure 6, de￿ned for ￿ 6= 0f￿ = 2 [2:5;3]. The SNR provides a visual summary of the discussion
of the mean and the variance of the wedges. The signal does not have a monotonic behavior
since for ￿ 2 (0:02;0:25) the mean of the wedge increases more -on average- than the standard
deviation of ￿i, i = S;EC;EL. For ￿ ￿ 25, the noisiness of the wedges overpowers the
strength of the signal up to the point (￿ ! 2:5) in which the consumer is better o⁄ paying
22See Tables 10a-10d in Appendix B.
23This result seems at odds with Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007). However, as noted by, e.g.,
Primiceri, Schaumburg and Tabalotti (2006), in a set up with two Euler equations, the data show that
shocks to the intertemporal ￿rst order condition dominate those to the intra-temporal condition.
27very little or no attention to wealth by planning constant consumption and leisure.
Measures of Elasticities
Another assessment of the intertemporal and intratemporal conditions (S)-(EL) can be
done by studying the responses of consumption and labor to changes in wages. In 4.2.1, I
derive short-run elasticities by computing the reactions of consumption and labor to a tem-
porary shock to wage. Similarly, I derive long-run elasticities through the average response
of consumption and labor to a permanent shock to wage.
Predictions from Impulse-Responses to shocks to wages
As stated in Mankiw, et. al. (1985), an intuitive way to think about elasticities is via
impulse response functions. To gather a sense of short-run elasticities, one can look at the
response of consumption and labor to a anticipated 10% increase in the mean of wage in
t = 0 that lasts till t = 1. Likewise, the average impulse-response of consumption and labor
to an anticipated and permanent 10% increase in the mean of wage might be a good proxy
of the long-run elasticities.
Figures 7a-7b plot the response of labor and consumption to changes in wage for the
model (solid lines) as well as the in￿nite information equivalent (black dashed line). Both
changes are assumed to occur in period t = 1 and they are known at t = 0. Figure 7a
displays the responses of consumption and labor to a permanent change in wage, while
￿gure 7b shows the responses of consumption and labor to a temporary change in wage of
the same amount. The top panels of ￿gure 7a present the impulse response for aggregate
consumption24 (top right panel) and labor (top left panel). The bottom panels of ￿gure 7a
show responses of consumption (bottom right panel) and labor (bottom left panel) for types
of consumers with three shadow costs of information-processing constraint, i.e., ￿ = 2 (green
24Aggregate consumption, refers to the weighted average of consumption of types ￿ = 0:02, ￿ = 0:2 and
￿ = 2 where each type gets the same weight.
28solid-star line), ￿ = 0:2 (blue solid line) and ￿ = 0:02 (magenta dotted-dashed line), together
with the corresponding series with in￿nite information .























































































Figure 7a. Responses to a permanent 10%￿change in wage: consumption (￿rst column) and labor (second column)
Consider the impulse response of consumption and labor for di⁄erent values of ￿
0s (bottom
panel). Under in￿nite information capacity, consumption jumps quickly to its new steady
state value while labor initially increases to sustain a higher level of consumption (wealth
e⁄ect). Once consumption reaches its new steady state, the substitution e⁄ect commands a
decrease in hours worked up until the household goes back to the work e⁄ort he exercised
before the shocks. With shadow cost of processing information ￿ = 0:2, people acknowledge
the change in wealth due to the change in wage slowly and cautiously increase both con-
sumption and labor. As they wait to fully adjust their behavior to the increase in wages,
their savings accumulate. Signals that wealth is higher than before get strong by the increase
in savings and in labor. Hence, ￿ = 0:2-type reacts to those signals by moving consumption
permanently up and slowly decreasing work e⁄ort. Note that the initial increase in labor
more than compensates for a permanently higher consumption. As a result, the steady state
value of hours worked is lower than it was without the change in wage. This mechanism
29is ampli￿ed for ￿ = 2. In such a case, due to a low ￿ ow of information, these types are
reluctant to change their behavior in response to the change in salary. Such a reluctance
results in more savings and, ultimately, higher steady state consumption and higher hours
worked with respect to the case with ￿ = 0:2. Aggregating these types (top panels), the
model obtains that, when wages change permanently, long-run consumption increases while
the e⁄ect on labor is muted. This ￿nding is consistent with secular patterns in U.S. data: in
the long-run, wages and consumption grow steady at about the same rate while movements
in per capita hours are negligible.
Consider Figure 7b. It shows a temporary 10% change in wage. The ￿rst column of Figure
7b shows impulse-response functions for aggregate consumption (top panel) and individual
consumption (bottom panel) when ￿ = 2 (green solid-star line), ￿ = 0:2 (blue solid line)
and ￿ = 0:02. The second column of Figure 7b plots the corresponding impulse-response for
labor. In all the four pictures the black dashed line indicates impulse-responses under the
in￿nite information solution.




























































































Figure 7b. Responses to a temporary 10%￿change in wage: consumption (￿rst column) and labor (second column)
The impulse-responses for consumption and labor in the in￿nite information solution
30(black dashed line) show an initial increase in consumption and labor followed by a sudden
decrease in hours worked while consumption reaches its new steady state. The model for
￿ = 0:2 (blue solid line, bottom panels) predicts that consumption grows slowly following
the shock to wage and so does labor supply. Accumulation of savings due to an increase
in labor e⁄ort allows consumption to achieve a higher steady state value than it was before
the shock. While consumption stabilizes to its new level, substitution e⁄ect prevails and
type ￿ = 0:2 trades o⁄ work for leisure up to the point in which labor reaches the same
level as before the change in wage. People with ￿ = 0:02 follows a similar pattern to people
with in￿nite processing constraint. However, the e⁄ects of the temporary shock are more
persistent than in the full information case. People with ￿ = 2 adjust their consumption
and labor decisions very slowly in response to the temporary shock. The logic of this result
is akin to the one used for the permanent shock: income e⁄ect kicks in with delays due to
low information ￿ ow and while people fail to react to the increase in wages they accumulate
savings. Once people acknowledge the increase in savings, they adjust consumption so to
keep it smooth from then on. At this point, the substitution e⁄ect prevails and people start
enjoying more leisure. The aggregate impulse responses (top panels) con￿rm these patterns.
Finding 4 below summarizes the results of the impulse-response exercise:
Finding 4. For the model M (￿;1;1), ￿ 2 (f0:02g;f0:2g;f2g) :
a. The long-run e⁄ects of a permanent increase in wages are: (1) a signi￿cant in-
crease in consumption, (2) a small or negative e⁄ect on hours worked. The e⁄ects
on consumption are more pronounced the lower the information ￿ow is.
b. The short-run e⁄ects of a temporary increase in wages are: (1) a sluggish and
positive response of labor (2) a response of consumption that is positive and more
sluggish than labor. The e⁄ects on labor are more pronounced the lower the infor-
mation ￿ow is.
The impulse-response functions suggest that a model of consumption- labor choices with
31rational inattention is in principle consistent with the empirical estimation of long-run and
short-run elasticities in U.S. data. Next section provides further support to this claim.
Long-run and Short-run Elasticities
Consider an econometrician who has data on consumption, labor and wealth generated
by a rational inattention economy. Suppose he wants to measure elasticities of labor supply
using a rational expectation model. Following Mankiw, et. al. (1985), to measure the













with data on (C;L;W;s) drawn from the solution of (2) - (14). Similarly, he measures
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and by feeding (21) with the same simulated data.
Table 1 displays the sample statistics -mean and standard deviation- of short-run and
long-run elasticities using (20)-(21) with averages of 7;000 Monte Carlo runs of time series
of consumption, labor and wealth drawn from the rational inattention solution p￿
￿ (W;C;L),
for ￿ 2 (f0g;f0:02g;f0:2g;f2g) and exogenously given wages.
Table 1 shows a disappointing performance of the rational expectations model (1)-(5),
akin to the one reported in Mankiw, et. al. (1985): The elasticities generated by the
optimality conditions (S)-(EL) evaluated with the arti￿cial data from p￿
￿ (W;C;L) imply
an inelastic and backward-bending long-run supply curve whereas the short-run elasticities
indicate strong substitution e⁄ect. From the intuition developed in section 4.2.1, rational
inattention o⁄ers a way to reconcile the results in Table 1. In particular, when the person
has very limited capacity (￿ = 2), a temporary change in wage is not registered immediately
32and as a result it is not re￿ ected in behavioral changes. When the person realizes that
his wealth has changed, he may want to adjust his work e⁄ort so that he can maintain a
smooth consumption pro￿le. Under rational expectations, the increase in labor following
a temporary and, say, positive change in wage translates into a very elastic labor supply
as shown in Table 2 (forth column, third row). Similarly, an individual with ￿ = 0:2 who
realizes with some delays the positive shift in wealth, may want to maintain his current labor
e⁄ort and accumulate savings to be able to a⁄ord permanently higher levels of consumption
and leisure than his pre-shock level. An econometrician that studies the data through the
lens of rational expectation theory and produces Table 1 would reach similar conclusion as
those of Mankiw, et. al. (1985) regarding the validity of stochastic dynamic optimization as
a tool to interpret U.S. labor data.
Conclusions
This paper compared the intertemporal and intratemporal conditions from the solution
of a rational expectation model to the solution of a model with an information-processing
constraint ￿ la Sims. By evaluating agent￿ s optimality conditions through consumption and
labor behaviors arising from a rational inattention model and a rational expectation model,
the paper showed that the model with ￿nite processing capacity can simultaneously account
for intertemporal and intratemporal wedges similar to those in the theoretical literature.
Moreover, by evaluating the impulse responses of consumption and labor to shock to wages,
the model with ￿nite processing capacity can reconcile the estimates of long-run and short-
run elasticities of substitution found in the empirical literature.
The two main implications of these ￿ndings are: (1) rational inattention theory pro-
vides a way to understand and reconcile puzzling results in the theoretical and empirical
consumption-labor choices literature; (2) making a leap to a fully dynamic rational inat-
tention consumption leisure problem produces results interesting enough to be worth of the
33computational e⁄ort.
34Appendix A: Bellman Recursion and its properties25
The Bellman Recursion is a Contraction Mapping.
Proposition 1. For the discrete Rational Inattention consumption labor value recursion H
and two given functions V and U, it holds that
jjHV ￿ HUjj ￿ ￿ jjV ￿ Ujj;
with 0 ￿ ￿ < 1 and jj:jj the supreme norm. That is, the value recursion H is a
contraction mapping.
Proof. The H mapping displays:
























Suppose that jjHV ￿ HUjj is the maximum at point g. Let p1 denote the optimal control
for HV under g and p2 the optimal one for HU
HV (g) = H
p1V (g);
HU (g) = H
p2U (g):
=) jjHV (g) ￿ HU (g)jj = H
p1V (g) ￿ H
p2U (g):
25This appendix follows closely the work of Tutino (2009) to which I refer for details.
35Suppose WLOG that HV (g) ￿ HU (g): Since p1 maximizes HV at g , I get
H
p2V (g) ￿ H
p1V (g):
Hence,
jjHV ￿ HUjj =
jjHV (g) ￿ HU (g)jj =
H
p1V (g) ￿ H
p2U (g) ￿
H










a (￿))) ￿ (U
p2 (g
0






(jjV ￿ Ujj)p2g (w) ￿
￿ jjV ￿ Ujj:
Recalling that 0 ￿ ￿ < 1 completes the proof.
The Bellman Recursion is an Isotonic Mapping
Corollary For the discrete Rational Inattention consumption-laving value recursion H and
two given functions V and U, it holds that V ￿ U =) HV ￿ HU; that is the value
recursion H is an isotonic mapping.
Proof. Let p1 denote the optimal control for HV under g and p2 the optimal one for HU
HV (g) = H
p1V (g);




p1U (g) ￿ H
p2U (g):
From a given g, it is possible to compute g0
a (￿)jp1 for an arbitrary c and then the following




























































p1V (g) ￿ H
p1U (g) =)
H
p1V (g) ￿ H
p2U (g) =)
HV (g) ￿ HU (g) =) HV ￿ HU:
Note that g was chosen arbitrarily and, from it, g0
a (￿)jp1 completes the argument that the
value function is isotone.
The Optimal Value Function is Piecewise Linear
Proposition 2. If the utility is CRRA or LOG with a parameter of risk aversion ￿ 2
(0;+1) and inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply ￿ 2 [0;+1) and if Pr (aj;wi)
satis￿es (12)-(15), then the optimal n￿step value function Vn (g) can be expressed as:






37where the ￿ ￿ vectors, ￿ : W ! R, are jWj￿dimensional hyperplanes.
Proof. The proof is done via induction. I assume that all the operations are well-de￿ned in
their corresponding spaces. Let ￿ be the set that contains constraints (12)-(15) .For planning
horizon n = 0, I have only to take into account the immediate expected rewards and thus I
have that:



























I have the desired














0 (w);g (w). For the general case, using
equation (11):
























by the induction hypothesis











Plugging into the above equation (7) and by de￿nition of h:;:i ,
Vn￿1 (g
0








































































0)T (￿;w;c;l) ￿ p; g
+#
(28)









0)T (￿ : w;c;l) ￿ p: (29)
Note that these hyperplanes are independent on the prior g for which I am computing Vn:
Thus, the value function amounts to
Vn (g) = max
p2￿
"



























Note that ￿p;a;g is a subset of ￿j
p;a and using this subset results into
Vn (g) = max
p2￿
"





































39is a ￿nite set of linear function parametrized in the action set.
.. and Convex (PCWL)
Proposition 3. Assuming the CRRA or LOG utility function and the conditions of Propo-
sition 1, let V0 be an initial value function that is piecewise linear and convex. Then the
ith value function obtained after a ￿nite number of update steps for a rational inatten-
tion consumption-saving problem is also ￿nite, piecewise linear and convex (PCWL).
Proof. The ￿rst task is to prove that f￿i
ngi sets are discrete for all n. The proof proceeds
via induction. Assuming CRRA/LOG utility and since the optimal policy belongs to ￿, it




































are discrete, for a given action p and consumption c, I can only
generate ￿j
p;c￿vectors. Now, ￿xing p it is possible to select one of the M ￿j
p;c￿vectors for
each one of the observed consumption c and, thus, f￿j
ngi is a discrete set. The previous
proposition, shows the value function to be convex. The piecewise-linear component of the
properties comes from the fact that f￿j
ngi set is of ￿nite cardinality. It follows that Vn is
de￿ned as a ￿nite set of linear functions.
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45Figure Legends
Figure 1. A typical day of a rationally inattentive person.
Figure 2a. Optimal conditional distribution of consumption for ￿ = 0:2 (bar) and ￿ = 2
(line).
Figure 2b. Optimal conditional distribution of labor for ￿ = 0:2 (bar) and ￿ = 2 (line).
Figure 3. Sample path of consumption for di⁄erent ￿￿ s.
Figure 4. Time series of consumption and labor, various ￿:
Figure 5. Time series of wealth and consumption, log-lin utility, various ￿:
Figure 6. Mean -￿rst column-, standard deviation -second column- and SNR of ￿S (red),
￿EC (blue) and ￿EL (green).
Figure 7a. Responses to a permanent 10%￿change in wage: consumption (￿rst column)
and labor (second column).
Figure 7b. Responses to a permanent 10%￿change in wage: consumption (￿rst column)
and labor (second column).
46Table
￿ = 0 ￿ = 0:02 ￿ = 0:2 ￿ = 2

















SR 1:09 2:3 7:5 10:6

















LR 0:89 0:36 ￿0:08 ￿0:17
Table 1: Estimates of long-run and short-run elasticities from the RE model under RI data samples. Stdv. in parenthesis
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